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Breaking Up is Hard to Do: 
The Neil Sedaka Theory of Independence Referendums   
 
“International politics is never about democracy and 
human rights. It's about the interests of states.  
Remember that, no matter what you  
are told in history lessons” 
 
Egon Bahr, German Diplomat (1922 –2015) 
 
 
Abstract: This article analyses the factors conducive to recognizing independence referendums 
and to winning these votes. After a tour d’horizon of the history of referendums on 
independence and a summary of the legal position, the article argues that independence 
referendums are most likely to be implemented when this is in the interest of the three Western 
Powers on the UN Security council. While there is a statistically significant correlation between 
the support for independence (the yes-vote) and international recognition, this is much lower 
than the 100 per cent association between support of the three permanent Western Powers on 
the Security Council and international recognition. Countries may cite legal, democratic and 
philosophical principles but the statistical and historical facts suggest that these are of 
secondary importance when it comes to recognising states after independence referendums.  
 
 
The Context and Development of Independence Referendums 
This is an article about the recognition of new states and the role of referendums in the process. 
Given the interdisciplinary nature of the topic (it straddles political science, law and even moral 
philosophy), the article will consider the ethical arguments for secession and recognition, the 
legal norms governing the process, and the positive and political science theory of when would-
be states succeed in becoming recognized by the international community. Throughout, the 
article seeks to understand the role of referendums in the process of establishing new states, 
and, as a corollary, their role (if any) in winning international recognition. The general 
hypothesis – though not stated in strictly Popperian terms (See Popper 1963) – is that power 
politics plays a decisive role and that legal principles and democratic legitimacy play more 
subordinate roles.  
 
Referendums have played a pivotal – and often controversial role – in the declarations of 
independence, and the ‘will of the people’ is often used as a political trump card that overrides 
other concerns and even constitutional positions. For example, when Russia annexed Crimea 
(after the peninsula had voted for independence from Ukraine in 2014 in a referendum of 
dubious legality and questionable fairness), Vladimir Putin stated, that the referendum was 
justified, and moreover ‘the [Crimea] referendum was fair and transparent, and the people of 
Crimea clearly and convincingly expressed their will and stated that they want to be with 
Russia” (Kremin 2014).  
 
However, when the same argument was invoked in the case of Bosnia’s declaration of 
independence in 1991 – albeit this time by western powers – Russia disagreed (Orentlicher 
2003). What is puzzling about this debate is that references to referendums are used selectively; 
sometimes governments base their arguments on direct democracy, at other times they don’t. 
For example, Russia recognized the ‘right of self-determination in Crimea in 2014, but denied 
the same right to the Kosovans two decades earlier.  Likewise, the Western States recognised 
Ukraine in 1991 but did not recognize Kurdistan in 2016. This raises the question if the ‘will 
of the people’, as expressed in referendums, is but an opportunist tool in the hands of politicians 
or if it is an objective norm with legal and political force? Before we can move on to answering 
these questions, a brief overview of the broader literature is required. 
 
There is a considerable literature on secession, independence and the recognition of new states. 
Pioneering articles and books from the early 1980s (Wood, 1981; Beran 1984), have been 
complemented by research reflecting the situation after the end of the Cold War and in the first 
decades of the 21st Century. This research follows different strands and arguments, and it is 
difficult to identify a clear single paradigm. Some scholars, beginning with Buchanan (1997) 
consider the normative aspects of national self-determination (Waters 2020). The prescriptive 
case for when states should be allowed to secede has even been developed into a more general 
theory (Wellman 2005). Other contributions to the literature, consider the legal norms – such 
as they are – of establishing new states and their recognition by the international community. 
Often drawing on the pioneering work of earlier jurists (Kelsen, 1941; Lauterpacht, 1944), 
recent research in positive legal theory and have sought to summarize the international law of 
secession and recognition (Rai, 2002; Kohen and Kohen, 2006; Radan 2012). This article 
recognises these earlier contributions but brings earlier jurisprudence up to date in the light of 
recent judgements and obiter dicta in international and national courts. This is not a paper on 
jurisprudence or legal theory, and the paper engages with the legal arguments from the point 
of view of political science. Hence it does not seek to assess the arguments’ congruence with 
opinio juris but rather with interests and realpolitik. As such the present paper analyses the 
essentially power-based argument which is hypothesized to lie behind the judgements by legal 
institutions. Thus, the present paper draws on a multidisciplinary approach similar to that 
pursued by (Burke-White, 2014; Christopher, 2011). In this way, the paper draws on 
empirically oriented political scientists who have looked at the causes of secession and 
recognition. This strand of research includes comparative politics (Mendez and Germann,  
2018; Fabry, 2010; Lehning, 2005), international relations (Pavkovic and Peter Radan, 2016; 
Coggins 2011), and research on public administration (Qvortrup 2013 for a summery). 
Especially the contributions by Pavkovic and Radan (2016), Fabry (2010), Burke-White (2014) 
and Christopher (2011) stand out as they use concrete empirical studies to understand the 
anatomy of secession and independence. These studies, especially the two former ones, are 
important as they have drawn on concrete cases, and on literature and primary evidence in 
Slavonic languages. However, this ideographic approach, which is also pursued in Christopher 
(2011) - means that there are questions of representativeness which make it difficult to draw 
more universal conclusions. The present paper, unlike the earlier studies, widens the scope and 
considers the whole universe of the creation of new states. This paper is substantially based on 
evidence provided by Coggins (2011), namely that ‘international [ power] politics ultimately 
determine which aspiring system members will succeed in becoming new states’ (Coggins 
2011: 433). However, it does this by focusing on the role of referendums in the process of 
secession, something Coggins only mentions in passing. This focus means that the article 
contributes to an area which is much discussed and debated, yet one that only in recent years 
has been the subject of empirical study. Apart from a handful of books and articles (Dion, 1996; 
Leduc, 2003; Laponce, 2010; Qvortrup, 2014), most of the literature has focused on single 
country case studies from new states (Potichnyj, 1991; Muiznieks, 1995). All these studies 
looked at the input-side of the independence referendum; the decision to call a referendum 
(Qvortrup, 2014), its organisation (Laponce, 2010) and the factors determining the people’s 
decisions (Dion, 1996). This article looks at the effects (if any) of these votes on the decisions 
by the international community to recognise (or not) the seceding state. While there is a large 
literature on the international relations of recognition (Fabry, 2010) and sovereignty (Krasner, 
1999) this literature has hitherto not been related to scholarships on referendums. This paper 
changes this. 
 
Before looking at the factors determining the fate of independence referendums, it is useful to 
put these into context of the general literature on these votes. Overall, there are three types, 
  
• Ad hoc referendums (questions to solve a perceived political issue – such as David 
Cameron’s decision to hold a referendum on UK membership of the European Union 
2016); 
• Initiatives (votes initiated by a specified number of electors on a) already enacted 
legislation (as in Switzerland) or b) on new laws (as in Hungary), and: 
• Constitutional Referendums (see next paragraph). 
 
By convention, there are three types of Constitutional Referendums,  
 
The Constitutional doctrine normally distinguishes between three types of 
constitutional referendums: on the approval of the constitution, on its revision, and on 
sovereignty issues (like the foundation of a new state) (Morel, 2012: 504).  
 
There has been a considerable debate on independence referendums and scholarly writings 
about them (Laponce, 2010; Leduc, 2003; Qvortrup, 2014) but the number of them is 
comparatively small. There has similarly been considerable debate as to what constitute an 
independence referendum. Mendez and Germann (2018) adopt a broad definition and identify 
no less than 602 ‘sovereignty referendums’ in the period 1776-2012. However, this category 
also includes referendums on self-government, devolution and issues that fall short of 
statehood. As this article is focussed on referendums that pertain to the establishment of a new 
state or a new subject in international law, the number of cases in the present study is 
considerably smaller. 
Thus, out of the 1200 nation-wide referendums held since 1793, only 60 (or 6 per cent) have 
pertained to independence (of which only three (or 5 per cent) have returned a ’no’ vote 
(Quebec, in respectively, 1980 and 1995, in Scotland in 2014 and New Caledonia in 2018). 
(Though other referendums have failed because they did not satisfy super-majority 
requirements, e.g. in Nevis in 1998 and in several referendums in Palau in the 1980s).  
Historically, independence referendums have come in waves. In the early 1860s, the US states 
of Arkansas, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia – held referendums on independence following 
the election of Abraham Lincoln to the US presidency. All the referendums were won but no 
country recognised the results (Mattern 1921).  
 
The result of the referendum in Virginia is particularly noteworthy. Before the vote, 
representatives from counties in Western Virginia declared that they, in the event of a ‘yes’ 
vote for independence, would establish a new state and that the constitution of this new state 
would be approved by the voters in a referendum.  
 
Virginia as a whole voted for secession: 21,896 were in favour – 16,646 were against. However, 
in the western counties 8,375 out of the 9,758 votes cast were against secession (Mattern, 
1920:120). The western counties sent delegates to a specially convened convention, which 
declared the referendum in Virginia as ‘illegal, onoperative, null, void and without force and 
effect’ (Quoted in Mattern, 1920: 123). They then ‘passed an ordinance providing for the 
formation of a new state out of the portion of the territory of this state [Virginia]. This ordinance 
was to be and was submitted to a plebiscite’ (Mattern 1920:123). 18,000 voted for a new state 
781 voted against it. (Cited in Mattern. ibid).  
 
Figure 1: Referendums on independence 1860-2017 
 
 
Note: This figure does not include the four multi-option referendums in Puerto Rico (1968, 1993, 1998 and 2012), 
which formally included ‘independence’ as one of the options. However, the table includes the two-round multi-
option referendum in Newfoundland in 1948 as independence was one of the choices in the run-off. The 
independence options lost to ‘statehood’ and the former British territory became a Canadian Province. (See 
Qvortrup 2014: 69) 
 
After the American Civil War, the US Supreme Court established in Texas v White that 
unilateral declarations of independence were unconstitutional. This principle was sustained 
most recently when the Alaskan Supreme Court in 2006 in Kohlhaas v Alaska ruled a 











After the American secession-votes there was gap of a few decades before Norway voted in a 
referendum on independence in 1905, and then a hiatus again until the mid 1930s when the 
number of independence referendums began to pick up with the unrecognised, but successful, 
independence referendum in Western Australia in 1933. In this case, 68% voted in favour, but 
the vote was ignored as the secessionist party lost the state election on the same day (Qvortrup, 
2014: 29). The vote for independence for the Philippines in 1935 was another example.  
 
After the Second World War, the referendum device was increasingly used to show popular 
approval for decolonization, though not all countries held plebiscites before they broke with 
their erstwhile colonial overlords. This was especially the case in French colonies such as 
Cambodia (1945), Guinea (1958) and Algeria (1962). 
 
After a drop in the 1970s, there was an explosion of independence votes in the years 
immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Soviet Communism. 
 
Not all independence referendums are comparable. Different historical and legal circumstances 
play a role. As stated in the introduction to this special issue (Lapachelle and Qvortrup, this 
issue), there is a fundamental difference between polyarchies and autocratic states, as well as 
there is a distinction to be made between ethnic and civic nationalism.  
 
While there are examples of civic nationalist movements in polyarchic states (e.g. Scotland 
2014), as well as in competitive autocracies (South Sudan and East Timor), the vast number of 
independence referendums take place in polities where politicians seek to exploit ethnic 
nationalist feelings (Qvortrup, 2014). Most of these referendums are held in countries with less 
than pristine democratic records. Thus, while there is at least one example of a polyarchic polity 
where ethnic nationalist arguments have thrived (e.g. Canada in 1995), the vast majority of 
referendums on independence have taken place in competitive autocracies and have seen 
would-be leaders of new states appeal to ethnic nationalism (see, e.g. Ukraine, Croatia and 
Eritrea). 
 
In addition to these sociological differences, there are also legal differences between the types 
of referendums held. Subdividing independence referendums Şen (2017: 213), distinguishes 
between three pure types, 
 
1) Post-Colonial (e.g. Philippines 1935); 
2) By agreement (Montenegro 2006 and New Caledonia 2018); 
3) Unilateral: (Quebec 1995 and Somaliland 2001). 
 





Figure 2: Types of referendums and international recognition  
 
Based on Şen (2017) and Qvortrup (2017) 
 
Legal recognition 
Not all of these different types of independence referendums have been equally conducive to 
the establishment of a new independent state. As Coggins has previously noted, ‘evidence 
supporting the consent-first requirement is equivocal’ (Coggins, 2011: 445) 
 
As Figure 2 shows, all the referendums in post-colonial territories (such as the Philippines in 
1935, Micronesia 1983 and most recently in East Timor in 1999) have been recognised if the 
voters have returned a yes vote. The same is true for referendums held following an agreement, 
such as in the cases of the Montenegro referendum in 2006 and the referendum in South Sudan 
in 2011. At the time of writing it is still unclear if the outcome of the 2019 Bougainville 
referendum will be recognised by the international community as the vote needs to be ratified 
by the Papua New Guinea parliament in accordance with a pre-referendum agreement. In the 
referendum 98 percent voted for secession on an 87 percent turnout. 
 
It seems that the international community – which oversees these two types of referendums – 
have been keen to ensure that their endeavours have not gone to waste, though it should be 
noted that some international agreements on popular votes have not resulted in actual 
referendums being held. The planned referendums on the futures of, respectively, Kashmir and 
Western Sahara are cases in point. These two latter referendums deserve to be mentioned 
although – or perhaps because – no referendum has taken place in either of the jurisdictions. 
Thus, despite being condemned by the UN Security Council for its illegal annexation of 
Western Sahara, Morocco has delayed holding a referendum on the future status of annexed 
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Similar delaying tactics have been deployed by India over the disputed territory of Kashmir. 
The UN Security Council called for a referendum in Resolution 47, which stated that ‘A 
plebiscite will be held when it shall be found by the Commission that the cease-fire and truce 
arrangements set forth in Parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948’. 
That was 70 years ago at the time of writing. To date no referendum has been held. 
 
However, when referendums are held, the outcome has been accepted by the international 
community and by the parent states. Indeed, even when the result of the referendum was not 
legally binding (due to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty) the outcome of the 
referendum has been ratified by parliaments. Thus, the parliament of Indonesia – after 
considerable pressure from the international community – recognised the outcome of the 1999 
East Timorese independence referendum.  
 
The situation is markedly different for unilateral independence referendums. This type of 
independence referendum constitutes the majority of the 44 independence referendums held 
since 1980. Thirty six or 85% were in this category. Only in one in twelve cases was the 
referendum followed by international recognition of the new state.  
 
Why is it that some referendums – even unilateral ones – result in the establishment of a new 
state (such as in the case of Bosnia, Estonia and the Ukraine) but not in other cases such as in 
Catalonia, Tartarstan and Somaliland? To answer this, we need to look at the legal aspects 
pertaining to – what misleadingly – is called the ‘right to self-determination’ (Dobelle, 1996). 
 
The legal argument 
Legal philosophers may disagree at the theoretical level as to whether the law is the  way acts 
of parliament or legal precedents are interpreted by the courts or whether there is some higher 
legal principle – or natural law – which overrides ‘black letter law’. Proponents of the latter 
view include Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274), but the doctrine can be traced back to Sophocles’ 
Antigone in fifth Century BC who held that statutes and precedents that are at odds with natural 
law must give way. That is, ‘a legal norm fails to be valid if it goes against the human reason, 
regardless of the fact that it has been adopted by the state’ (Thomas Aquinas quoted in Şen 
2015: 59). St Thomas even accepted that it would be justified to break the law would be 
warranted if “it should happen that the observance of such a law would be damaging to the 
general well-being” (Aquinas 1959: 141). 
 
Whatever the philosophical merits of this view, courts and governments do not tend to be 
persuaded by legal theory or jurisprudence. Thus, while the late legal theorist Neil 
MacCormick, in the case of the United Kingdom, believed one could answer the question ‘Is 
there a constitutional path to Scottish independence?’ affirmatively (MacCormick 2000), this 
is very much a minority view among practicing lawyers.  
 
Thus, while one may philosophically disagree with the ethical and moral tenants of legal 
positivism, this doctrine holds sway in practical politics. Hence, the following is based on a 
reading of the black letter law pertaining to independence referendums. 
 
The black letter law of the ‘right’ to self-determination referendums is, in a sense, very simple. 
In the words of James Crawford, ‘there is no unilateral right to secede based merely on a 
majority vote of the population of a given sub-division or territory’ (Crawford, 2006: 417). 
Those who espouse a similar legal positivist approach will further stress that this is consistent 
with the jurisprudence of international courts. Thus, in an obiter dicta in the Kosovo Case 
Judge Yusuf, opined,  
 
A radically or ethnically distinct group within a state, even if it qualifies as a people for 
the purposes of self-determination, does not have the right to unilateral self-
determination simply because it wishes to create its own separate state (Re Kosovo, 
2010: 1410).  
 
This view regarding the legality of independence referendums is near identical to the doctrine 
followed by domestic courts. In the Canadian case of Bertrand v. Québec, it was held per 
Justice Robert Lesage that a referendum on a unilateral declaration would be, ‘manifestly 
illegal’. This is still the legal position notwithstanding the reasoning in the much cited (and 
little often misunderstood) Re Quebec (see below). 
 
Thus, the general rule is that referendums have to be held in accordance with existing 
constitutions (such a provision exists in Art 39(3) of the Ethiopian constitution and was used 
when Eritrea seceded in 1993. But few other states provide for this possibility, the exceptions 
are Art. 74 of the Constitution of Uzbekistan, Art. 4 of the Constitution of Liechtenstein and 
previously Art. 60 of the Constitution of Serbia-Montenegro. 
 
Another legal avenue to secession is after an agreement between the area that seeks secession 
and the larger state of which it is part (this is what happened in the very different cases of East 
Timor 1999, South Sudan, 2011, Scotland 2014, and a fortiori Bougainville 2019 (Radan, 2012: 
14).   
 
Following this logic, it would seem that the referendums in both Catalonia and Kurdistan, to 
take two recent examples, were both illegal and unconstitutional. The same argument was used 
by Barack Obama in the case of Crimea. A few days before the poll, the US President said, 
‘the proposed referendum on the future of Crimea would violate the Ukrainian constitution and 
violate international law ... we are well beyond the days when borders can be redrawn over the 
heads of democratic leaders’ (White House 2014). 
  
Based on the same reasoning, the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was well within his right 
to claim that the Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian referendums on independence in the Spring 
of 1991 were illegal and that he was the guarantor of Pravovoe gosudarstvo – the equivalent 
of the rule of law in Soviet jurisprudence. Of course, some would say, previously, under the 
so-called Stalin Constitution 1936, individual Soviet states did indeed have the right to self-
determination referendums under Art 48. But this provision had been dropped in the 
Khrushchev Constitution of 1956. Consequently, the Baltic republics were in breach in the 
early 1990s.  
 
Yet, these niceties of constitutional theory were forgotten by Vladimir Putin a couple of 
decades later. Speaking before the referendum in Crimea in 2014, the Russian President stated 
that ‘declarations of independence may, and often do, violate domestic legislation. However, 
this does not make them violations of international law’ (Kremin 2014).  
 
Let’s once again consider the Catalan and Kurdish cases. As, respectively, the Iraqi and the 
Spanish constitutions do not allow for independence referendums, the two referendums held in 
these two entities referendum were, it would seem, ipso facto, unconstitutional. 
 
Yet matters are not that simple. Admittedly, all other things being equal, a country only has a 
right if it follows the rules. However, when a region is part of an undemocratic constitutional 
order matters are a bit more complex. Antonio Cassese has argued,  
 
When the central authorities of a sovereign State persistently refuse to grant 
participatory rights to a religious or racial group, grossly and systematically trample 
upon their fundamental rights, and deny them the possibility of reaching a peaceful 
settlement within the framework of the State structure…a group may secede – thus 
exercising the most radical form of external self-determination – once it is clear that all 
attempts to achieve internal self-determination have failed or are destined to fail 
(Cassese, 1995: 119-120).  
 
As Iraq is not a well-functioning democratic state, it could be argued that Kurdistan meets these 
criteria. Again, the comparison with the Soviet Union is illustrative. Notwithstanding 
Gorbachev’s reforms, the USSR was not a democratic regime, which consequently, provided 
the Baltic States with a justification for holding referendums. Interesting, Vladimir Putin used 
the same justification for the referendum in Crimea in 2014. Somewhat stretching the argument 
Putin followed the same line, 
 
[Putin] claimed that these ethnic Russians, who included some Russian citizens, had 
been subjected to the kind of systematic oppression that triggers the right of self-
determination under international law, calling the members of the Ukrainian 
government ‘nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites’ who had 
introduced ‘a draft law to revise the language policy, which was a direct infringement 
on the rights of ethnic minorities’ and were the ‘ideological heirs of [Stepan] Bandera, 
Hitler’s accomplice during World War II’ (Burke-White 2014: 7) 
 
It is not difficult to see this example as opportunist and it is clear that the international norms 
require more substantial violations than the ones in Ukraine – and Spain. But, given that the 
latter is a democratic state (according to both Freedom House and Polity IV), this rule hardly 
covers Catalonia. While the Spanish government, arguably acted in a way that appeared grossly 
disproportionate (with police violence and the arrest of democratically elected politicians), the 
legal argument remains the same. Catalonia is not currently part of a non-democratic state.  
 
Based on the situation, as it stands now, the Catalan referendum in 2017 was, from a purely 
legal perspective, extra constitutional. In a legal system under the rule of law, the powers of 
state institutions have to be established in law. The basic principle of D’état du Droit is that 
citizens can do anything unless it is expressly prohibited. Public bodies or ‘emanations of the 
state’ an only do things that are expressly allowed. Thus, the latter cannot legally speaking take 
actions that are not prescribed in enabling legislation. To pass legislation outside the boundaries 
of the constitution or enabling legislation is the very definition of being ultra vires. 
 
But does the law have to be that inflexible? Not necessarily. In Canada, the two referendums 
held in Quebec in 1980 and 1995, were not strictly speaking within the powers granted to the 
Provinces by the Canadian Constitution (Şen, 2015). Technically speaking, the referendums 
were ultra vires. Yet, the Canadian judges, realising that legality ultimately rests on a modicum 
of legitimacy followed a more pragmatic logic. In the celebrated case, Re Quebec, the Court 
was asked the question, ‘Under the Constitution of Canada, can the National Assembly, 
legislature or Government of Quebec effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?’ 
The Court held that while the ‘secession of Quebec from Canada cannot be 
accomplished…unilaterally’, a referendum itself was not unconstitutional but a mechanism of 
gauging the will of the francophone province. Consequently a referendum, provided it resulted 
in a “clear majority”, “would confer legitimacy on the efforts of the Quebec government”’ (Re 
Secession of Quebec, 1998: 385).  
 
In other words, a result in favour of secession would require the rest of Canada to negotiate 
with Quebec. Needless to say, this ruling does not apply in Spain. But the Canadian example 
suggests that other countries’ courts have shown a flexibility and appreciation of nuances that 
is conducive to compromises. These examples would seem to suggest that the international law 
pertaining to independence referendums is clear and simple. Alas, this is very far from being 
the case (For a more general discussion see Şen 2015: 77ff).  
 
While governments may confidently cite principles, the practice of independence referendums 
seemingly owes more to national interest than to adherence to principles of jurisprudence. For 
example, the states of Western Europe readily recognised the secessions of several former 
Yugoslav republics in the early 1990s – although these new states did not adhere to the 
aforementioned legal principles. And yet, in other cases international recognition has been less 
forthcoming even if the countries have seemingly followed the established norms. To wit, no 
state has to date recognised the outcome of Nagorno-Karabakh’s referendum in 1991, although 
Azerbaijan is very far from being a democratic state (the country has a Freedom House Score 
of 7 – the same as North Korea) despite the greater freedoms for the citizens/inhabitants of the 
break-away republic.  
 
Similarly, no state recognised the referendum in Somaliland although this enclave is 
considerably more democratic, peaceful and respecting of the rule of law than Somalia, which 
at the time of the referendum was an arch-typical failed state. For all the legal arguments, 
acceptance of referendum results is ultimately a political rather than a legal decision. In other 
words, are all these arguments just examples of what IR scholar Stephen Krasner (1999) with 
an apt phrase called ‘organised hypocrisy’?  Or, are states actually recognised if they follow 
the rules of the game? Or, it is simply a matter of power politics?  
 
When are referendums on independence recognised? 
Lawyers are interested in what is – or is not – legal and in accordance with more or less rigid 
rules. Political scientists, by contrast, are interested in what actually happens and the causes 
effecting this.  Are there from a political science– or international relations – point of view 
causes and tendencies associated with recognition of referendum results? Or, are independence 
referendums simply recognised when the rules are followed? 
 
Alternatively, do we now live in a democratic age in which the gold standard of legitimacy is 
popular support? And, if the answer is in the affirmative, do independence referendums tend 
to be recognised when secession is supported by a large majority of the new demos on a large 
turnout? Or is it all down to power politics?  
 
Politicians who are sure of the backing of the people often point to the legitimizing effects of 
referendums. This, indeed, has been characteristic of independence referendums since the 
earliest days. Camillo Benso di Cavour (1810-1861), the Italian statesman, who was the 
responsible for the politics of Italian unification, wrote the following before the s in Tuscana 
and Emilia in 1860,  
 
I await with anxiety the result of the count, which is taking place in Central Italy. If, as 
I hope, this last proof is decisive (questa ultima prova), we have written a marvellous 
page in the history of Italy. Even should Prussia and Russia contest the legal value of 
universal suffrage, they cannot place in doubt (non potranno mettere in dubbio) the 
immense importance of the event today brought to pass. Dukes, archdukes and grand-
dukes will be buried forever beneath the heap of votes deposited in urns of voting places 
of Tuscany and Emilia (Cavour 1883, 211). 
 
At the time – over 150 years ago – democratic legitimacy seemingly had a legitimizing effect. 
And this effect was even stronger a couple of generations later when the American political 
scientist Sarah Wambaugh observed, ‘There was not one of the great powers, not even Austria 
or Russia, which did not participate in those years [1848-1870] in some form of appeal to 
national self-determination to settle Europe’s numerous territorial questions’ (Wambaugh 
1933: xxxiii).  
 
In the light of the latter, it would seem reasonable and plausible that outcomes of referendums 
on independence would have an even stronger legitimizing force in an age where ‘democracy’ 
– to use a term from analytical philosophy - is an illocutionary speech-act, a term that demands 
unconditional observance (Searle 1968).  
 
Yet, with recent votes – such as the one in Kurdistan in 2017 – it seems that independence 
referendums, despite this near universal acceptance of the rhetoric of democracy, only tend to 
lead to independence and recognition when this is in the national interest of major powers. 
Whether it is one or the other – or more likely a combination of the two – is an empirical 
question.  
 
The hypothesis in the following is that power politics is the more important factor and that this 
can be demonstrated statistically.  
 
Statistical Analysis  
Since the 1980s there have been 44 referendums which have resulted independence. This 
analysis is based on the referendums held since the break-down of the Soviet Union. Before 
that date there had been relatively few independence referendums (only a handful in each 
decade). The first independence referendums were held in the US Confederate States Texas, 
Virginia, Tennessee and Arkansas, where narrow majorities voted for independence in 1861. 
Other independence referendums include Norway (1905), Iceland (1944), Jamaica (1961) 
Algeria (1962) and Malta (1964). For a discussion of these referendums see Qvortrup (2014) 
and Şen (2015). Of these 16 (or 36 per cent) have resulted in the establishment of a new state. 
What are the factors associated with the establishment of these new states?  
 
Factors associated with recognition are the legal one ‘the seceding entity was part of a non—
democratic state. But there are also more political ones, e.g. a high turnout and a massive yes-
vote.  And then, there is the factor, which this article hypothesizes to be the most important one 
– whether the new state has the support of the international community – or, more specifically, 
the three ‘democratic’ permanent members of the UN Security Council. In the analysis below 
we have measured some of the factors that statistically could be conducive for when states are 
recognised using multiple logistic regression analysis. Without going into technical detail, this 
analysis measures the strength of the different given factors behind a phenomenon.  
 
The dependent variable is whether the state was recognised and took up a seat in the UN. The 
independent variables are the official yes vote, the turnout, the Freedom House score of the 
country from which the entity sought to secede and lastly a dummy variable for whether there 
was a support for secession among the five permanent members of the Security Council (in 
practice the USA, Britain and France).  
 
As Table 1 shows, Security Council support from the three permanent Western powers is the 
key determining factor (statistically significant at p<0.01). All the other variables were not 
statistically significant. This tendency is perhaps best illustrated by the example of Kosovo 
(See Newman and Visoka, 2018). The referendum in Kosovo was held over a decade ago, and 
although the result of the poll was overwhelming in favour, few countries rushed to welcome 
the country into the family of nations. This changed in the new century. After the Kosovan War 
(1998-1999), the Russians and the Chinese with secession movement of their own, continued 
to support their Serbian ally. The Western Powers, swung behind their ally, notwithstanding 
the questionable democratic legitimacy of the earlier referendum and the relatively low level 
of democratization (4.5 on the Freedom House scale). Yet, the Western powers saw it as being 
in their national and strategic interest to recognize the former Serbian province. Electoral 
fairness seemed less important than power politics. 
 
Table 1: Logistic Regression: Determinants of recognition of successful independence 
referendums  
Variables        Model 1 
Security Council Dummy     4.258*** 
        (1.778) 
Freedom House Score      -.298 
        (.742) 
Turnout       .100 
        (.90) 
Yes-Vote       .055 
        (.065) 
Negotiation/Constitutional Provision    1.054 
        (2.35) 
Constant        -15.134 
        (9.709) 
R;Squared: .72 (Nagelkerte): .52 N: 38     
*: p< .1,  **:  p< .05, *** p< .01 
 
Thus, whether the country part of a democracy or not (i.e. if the vote was held under the rules 
prescribed by legal norms) is statistically speaking irrelevant. While the direction of the 
statistical correlation is negative as expected (a high Freedom House score indicated less 
democracy), the level of margin of error – is several times above the conventionally accepted 
levels. Thus, it is not surprising that the Western powers – who had all but insisted that a 
referendum was a sufficient condition for granting Bosnia-Herzegovina its independence in 
1991 took no notice when the population (mainly Serbian) in North Kosovo voted against the 
institutions of Kosovo in 2012 (Barlovac, Bojana and Aliu Fatmir, 2012).  
Likewise, it is not surprising that they condemned the referendum on Crimea in 2014, which 
was held shortly after Russian supported troops had seized power on the Black Sea Peninsula. 
In this case the Moscow declared that the referendum was both democratic and legal, as it was 
held in accordance with the 1992 constitution of Crimea – and notwithstanding that the 
Ukrainian Constitution clearly stated that matters regarding statehood have to be decided in a 
nationwide referendum. 
 Both the principle of democracy and the ideal of the Rechtstaat, were used to legitimize power 
politics and pursuit of national interests.  It is thus interesting that, as a scholar has recently 
observed, in ‘Putin’s perspective, Russia’s actions in Crimea are nearly indistinguishable from 
those of the US in Kosovo’ (Burke-White 2014: 72). In Putin’s own words ‘a precedent our 
western colleagues created with their own hands in a very similar situation’. In his view, if a 
distinction can be drawn between the two cases, it rests on the fact that in Crimea not a ‘single 
shot [was] fired’ (Putin quoted in Burke-White 2014: 72). 
It would appear that Hersch Lauterpacht – the great Polish-British international lawyer - was 
correct when he, many years ago, found that the absence of institutional mechanisms to regulate 
state recognition or to clearly propose when recognition should be extended, means that states 
are left to apply their own judgment, guided by perceptions of self-interest (Lauterpacht, 1944). 
Likewise, whether the turnout was high or low did not matter one jut when it came to 
recognizing states. Some countries with low turnout became independent, e.g. Bosnia, others 
did not, e.g. Tartarstan. Whether the support (the yes-vote) was high or low was equally 
academic. Indeed, the yes-vote in Somaliland (1999) and Krajina (1992) both had very high 
yes-votes and both countries remain unrecognized. 
 
Conclusion  
Not all independence referendums are equal. There are three basic forms; referendums in 
postcolonial states (e.g. The Philippines in 1935), referendums following an agreement (Eritrea 
1993) and Unilaterally Declared Independence Referendums (e.g. the Yugoslav Republics in 
the early 1990s). Whereas all the referendums in the two first categories were recognized by 
the international community and duly led to the establishment of new states the same is not 
true for Unilaterally Declared Independence Referendums. Less than half of the latter were 
recognized. What determine this low success-rate? The answer is that the factors which 
determine to success – or otherwise – of an independence referendum are not whether the entity 
is part of a non-democratic regime (as legal theory would have us believe), nor the turnout and 
the yes vote (as democratic norms would suggest), but above all if secession is supported by 
(and in the interest of) Britain, France or the USA. 
 
To put it crudely, it was not in the interest of these democratic countries to recognize Kurdistan, 
Tartarstan, South Ossetia –or Catalonia. The great democratic powers’ arguments for not doing 
so might be legalistic or even philosophical but the statistical evidence suggest that these 
factors rarely are adhered to in practice. Ultimately, what matters is the elusive and yet very 
real ‘national interest’. Recognizing new states and their ‘right’ to hold referendums on 
independence is statistically and empirically unrelated to high theory and owes a lot to power 
politics and Realpolitik. This is not a comfortable conclusion in an age of democracy, nor is it 
one that may appeal to those who espouse theories of natural rights in the sphere of democracy. 
But as political scientists we are bound to describe the world as it is not as we would like it to 
be. Only a ‘realistic’ appreciation of the existing practices will enable us to challenge these – 
if we so wish.  
 
One is tempted to cite Neil Sedaka and say, ‘Breaking up is hard to do’. The lesson for the 
secession movements that espouse statehood and independence, and those who contemplate 
holding independence referendums, is this; make sure you have strong international backers 
before you initiate the vote. With the benefit of hindsight, Jacques Parizeau, the Quebec 
Premier, made the right decision to visit to Paris in 1995 to win support for independence. But, 
of course, he didn’t manage to convince enough of his compatriots of the merits of – what he 
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